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Abstract: William J. Baumol is the 2003 winner of the International Award for Entrepreneurship 
and Small Business Research. Throughout his career Baumol has urged the profession to pay 
attention to the instrumental role of entrepreneurship in economic renewal and growth. At the 
same time he has insisted that economists continue to use their usual tool box when the purview of 
analysis is extended to entrepreneurship. Hence, Baumol can be characterized as a revolutionary 
from within. In this article we present and discuss Baumol’s research contribution in the areas of 
entrepreneurship and small business economics, notably from a growth perspective. In addition to 
placing his work in these areas into the wider context of his full contribution, we emphasize 
Baumol’s findings that growth cannot be explained by the accumulation of various factors of 
production per se; human creativity and productive entrepreneurship are needed to combine the 
inputs in profitable ways. As a result, an institutional environment that encourages productive 
entrepreneurship and human experimentation becomes the ultimate determinant of economic 
growth. 
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* The authors of this article are chairman and member, respectively, of the Prize Committee for The 
International Award for Entrepreneurship and Small Business Research. The Prize is awarded by the Swedish 
Foundation for Small Business Research (FSF) and the Swedish Board of Industrial and Technical Development 
(NUTEK). An important aim with this prize is to attract broader attention to this research field. A precondition 
for choosing the winner of the award is that the research for which the award has been granted is a significant 
contribution to the theory and empirical understanding of entrepreneurship and the importance of 
entrepreneurship, new firm formation and small businesses in economic development. Apart from the honor the 
Prize consists of USD 50,000. It has been awarded annually since 1996. Previous winners include Zoltan Acs, 
Howard Aldrich, David Audretsch, and David Storey. More information about the Prize and previous winners is 
available at http://www.fsf.se/intaward.html.   1
Introduction 
The Swedish Foundation for Small Business Research (FSF) and the Swedish Board of 
Industrial and Technical Development (NUTEK) has given its 2003 International Award for 
Entrepreneurship and Small Business Research to William J. Baumol. In this article we 
present and evaluates the contributions of the Prize winner to the economics of 
entrepreneurship and economic growth. 
 
As a general theorist William J. Baumol has a long and outstanding record of addressing the 
real problems of our world. His career is now well into its sixth decade, but new insights still 
keep pouring out of his prolific pen. Although basically neoclassical, Baumol´s ambition has 
been to extend mainstream economics to be compatible with a wider range of theoretical 
assumptions and economic phenomena than the received model is capable of addressing in a 
relevant way. In doing so Baumol has constantly built new bridges that link theory, policy and 
practice. In many ways Baumol can be seen as a revolutionary from within in that he masters 
the tools of the trade and insists that they be used, as far as possible, to address real-life 
problems of great urgency.  
 
In fact, Baumol himself has been an entrepreneur in the markets for economic science, and it 
is only logical that Baumol was among the first to urge his fellow mainstreamers in a 1968 
American Economic Review article to start paying attention to the role of entrepreneurship in 
economic development, or to repeat his now famous words (p. 68): ”The theoretical firm is 
entrepreneurless – the Prince of Denmark has been expunged from the discussion of Hamlet.” 
 
 
Baumol´s Research Agenda – An Overview 
Baumols´s research on firm behavior and entrepreneurship is part of a broadly defined 
research agenda in economics, ranging from traditional neoclassical analysis (1961), an early 
bold attempt at economic dynamics (1951), and welfare economics and the theory of the state 
(1952), a revised version of his doctoral thesis from the University of London (1949), to the 
analysis of firm behavior (1959, 1971 [with Stewart]). The idea that firms may be sales 
maximizers rather than profit maximizers is also attributable to Baumol (1959). Above all,   2
Baumol’s entire research agenda has been inspired by the ambition to put life – not least 
entrepreneurial life – into economic theory, albeit, preferably without departing from the 
axiomatic foundation of the mainstream model. However, to make room for the 
Schumpeterian entrepreneur in economic theory is no easy task, perhaps it is infeasible, as 
Baumol admitted already in his seminal article on the subject. 
 
Baumol’s writing on business behavior and the economics of the firm is enormous and highly 
suggestive. It extends from traditional microeconomics, the behavioral theory of the firm 
(1971 [with Stewart]), and the use of rules of thumb in imperfect markets (1964 [with 
Quandt]) to his highly innovative work on the economics of the performing arts (1966 [with 
Bowen]), notably the Athenian Drama (1971) and the stimulating inquiry into the theater of 
renaissance London (1972 [with Oates]). The fundamental idea underlying this analysis was 
generalized in an article in the American Economic Review in 1967. This is probably his most 
cited work. There he shows that an economy with one industry with a potential for rapid long- 
term productivity growth (such as the engineering industry) and one sector (such as care of 
the elderly or the performing arts) which cannot increase productivity to any significant 
extent will experience an indefinite increase in the relative price of the output from the 
nonprogressive sector. One of two things will then happen: the real consumption of output 
from the nonprogresive sector will decrease strongly over time or its share of total 
expenditure will increase. This phenomenon is now generally referred to as Baumol’s Cost 
Disease, and its manifestations are apparent everywhere in the modern economy with cost 
crises in the public labor-intensive sector and enormous relative price increases for 
nonsubsidized opera performances, haute cuisine restaurants et cetera. This analysis 
coincides with, and resembles the problems of the nontraded goods sector discussed in the so-
called EFO report in Sweden, first presented in 1968 (Edgren, Faxen and Odhner, 1973).  
 
On the Role of the Entrepreneur 
Baumol’s work on the entrepreneur should be seen in the wider context of his analysis of firm 
behavior and of the economy at large. His analysis of the entrepreneur, in turn, has been 
guided by two principles that he formulated very early in his career: 
   3
1.  Make your assumptions confer with reality as much as you can (1948), but not to the 
extent that you cannot say anything. Therefore, it becomes necessary, he argues, to 
economize on the introduction of realism into analysis (1959, p. 4). 
2.  If possible, try to stay within the framework of neoclassical analysis.  
 
In attempting to introduce the live entrepreneur into mainstream analysis Baumol has tackled 
these problems head on. Six publications should be particularly highlighted in this context: 
 
1968  ”Entrepreneurship in Economic Theory” 
1978 (with Fischer)  ”Cost-Minimizing Number of Firms and Determination of 
Industry Structure” 
1982 (with Panzar and Willig)  Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure 
1990  ”Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive and 
Destructive” 
1993  Entrepreneurship, Management and the Structure of Payoffs 
2002  The Free-Market Innovation Machine – Analyzing the 
Growth Miracle of Capitalism 
 
Baumol (1968) examines the role of the entrepreneur from three different angles:  
(a) Why should we be concerned? Answer: Because entrepreneurship is a critical factor 
behind economic development.  
(b)  Why has economic theory failed to develop a formal analysis of entrepreneurship and 
why is this unlikely to change in the foreseeable future? Answer: Because using the 
calculus to present the entrepreneur as an automaton maximizer leads nowhere in the 
analysis of entrepreneurship. There is little hope that mainstream economics will 
abandon that approach in the near future, he continues (p. 68):
1 ”The terminology of 
game theory has been extremely suggestive; the willingness of the behaviorists to 
break away from traditional formulations has been encouraging; but I see no real 
breakthroughs in this area even on the distant horizon.”
2 
                                                 
1 There have been several attempts in recent years to include entrepreneurship in neoclassical growth models 
without disrupting their underlying axiomatic foundation; see, e.g., Aghion and Howitt (1992), Helpman (1992), 
and Holmes and Schmitz (2001). However, entrepreneurship has invariably been defined narrowly and has not 
in any way captured the wide-ranging and complex functions of the entrepreneur suggested outside mainstream 
economics (see, e.g., Glancey and McQuaid, 2000 and Swedberg, 2000). 
2 Johansson (2003) confirms that the entrepreneur is still largely absent from postgraduate training in economics. 
In a systematic review of all graduate textbooks used in micro, macro and industrial organization courses at 
Swedish graduate programs in 2002, he does not find a single reference to the entrepreneur or entrepreneurship.   4
(c) Why is it possible to say a great deal on the role of entrepreneurship even without a 
rigorous analysis of the behavior of the entrepreneur and the supply of 
entrepreneurship? Answer: Economic theory is focused on the use of inputs and tells 
us ”little about where they come from” (p. 69), since inputs are assumed to be 
exogenous. So trying to introduce the entrepreneur in mainstream economic theory 
means changing theory in a fundamental sense. But one way out would be to look 
instead at the payoff to the entrepreneur; for instance, if he or she undertakes R&D 
investments, how does the tax system affect the incentives to commercially exploit the 
new knowledge gained? 
 
The ideas outlined in his 1968 article have guided Baumol’s research on entrepreneurship 
since then. Despite his skepticism about the possibilities of rigorously modeling the 
entrepreneur in the context of mainstream economic theory, Baumol launched a grand project 
in the late 1970s to integrate entrepreneurial activity into the standard economic model. His 
theory (1982 [with Panzar and Willig]) of contestable markets was sold heavily and 
provocatively as an ”uprising in the theory of industry structure” and with such vigor that the 
profession took offense (see, inter alia, Schwarz and Reynolds, 1983). This analysis (1982, p. 
2) ”provides a generalization of the concept of the perfectly competitive market” to one which 
Baumol, Panzar and Willig called a ”perfectly contestable market” which was disciplined by 
potential competition from new entrants. Their main point, argued already in Baumol’s 
theoretical 1978 article (with Fischer), was that industry structure is now endogenously 
explained, not exogenously given. Furthermore, they claimed to show that a perfectly 
contestable equilibrium can exist for a very small number of firms, even under economies of 
scale. Contestable market theory replaces the price-taking assumption of perfect competition 
theory with rapid entry and exit. Free and perfectly reversible entry and costless exit provided 
the potential competition needed to achieve that. The theory, however, implied that not much 
actual entry or exit could take place. Critics were also fast to point out that many of the 
assumptions were not empirically relevant, and that a threat of entry is not credible if 
significant entry does not take place (Spence, 1983; Shepherd, 1984). 
 
One theoretical spinoff from contestable market theory touched upon in the 1982 book and 
article and returned to in a much later article by Audretsch, Baumol and Burke (2001) was a 
new approach to competition policy. By facilitating and stimulating innovative firm entry, 
notably through reducing barriers to entry, policymakers may have a potent instrument to   5
prevent monopoly formation through enhanced competition. This substitutes for the ”trust-
busting” regulator that emerges as the preferred method from mainstream static theory. This 
argument is, however, not entirely new. Already Adam Smith regarded freedom of entry as 
the most relevant indicator of competition and of the efficiency of the self-regulating system 
of the market, a system that was primarily disturbed, in his view, by ”monopoly produced by 
government regulation” (Anderson and Tollison, 1982). 
 
Can Static Equilibrium Be Saved? 
Entrepreneurship and firm turnover play critical roles in economic dynamics and endogenous 
growth. Baumol et al. (1982) took a bold step forward with contestable market theory. They 
replaced the price-taking assumption of the perfect competition model with perfect entry and 
exit. They were, however, securely fastened to the exogenous static equilibrium framework 
by a safety line. In fact, competitive entry was a threat defined such that the exogenous 
equilibrium properties could be retained. Here Baumol was true to his early (1968) 
”recommendation” that you stay as long as possible within the neoclassical framework. 
However, this had the unfortunate consequence that critics could say that contestable market 
theory contributed to our understanding of important economic phenomena, but that it was 
not a radically new ”uprising” in economic theory. The key problem with the contestability 
model was that significant realized costly entry and exit and strategic behavior of firms 
tended to upset the conditions necessary for the attainment of exogenous equilibrium.  
 
The key feature of the neoclassical model that distinguishes it from the alternative schools of 
economic thought is the existence of an exogenous equilibrium and a well-defined solution to 
the resource allocation problem (Rosen, 1997). Models in the Austrian and Schumpeterian 
tradition do not impose such conditions. Hence, they constitute the appropriate reference 
point to compare with the neoclassical model when it comes to defining a relevant 
entrepreneur and his/her role in the process of economic development. 
 
The general question to raise here, therefore, is whether the entrepreneur can at all be 
endogenized in an empirically meaningful way, as Baumol hoped, within the static exogenous 
equilibrium framework (Barreto, 1989; Eliasson, 1984), or rather if we can model the 
entrepreneur as we would realistically like to see him or her within that theoretical   6
framework. The general equilibrium model is a powerful analytical tool, unique to economics 
in the social sciences. But powerful analytical tools narrow the range of phenomena that can 
exist (within the model) and, hence limit understanding to that restricted set of phenomena. 
You will have to go outside the analytical model to understand, something Carl Menger 
(1871) regarded as unavoidable for Verstehen.  
 
Static equilibrium models have great difficulties dealing with the strategic behavior of agents 
that we tend to associate with entry and exit and monopolistic competition. Already Knut 
Wicksell (1923) remarked, when discussing a bold attempt by the young Swedish economist 
Gustav Åkerman (1921, 1923) to ”model” simultaneous production and price setting behavior 
using verbal reasoning and simple ”High School” mathematics, that normally you hold 
structures and distribution constant when studying price-setting behavior, and prices constant 
when studying production change. When you have carried out the two partial analyses you 
may try to model simultaneous price and quantity setting. Apparently Wicksell, being also a 
mathematician, thought it could be done within the exogenous equilibrium framework, and 
thus would have sided with Baumol.  
 
The experience of many, including the neo-Keynesians, however, is that this is no easy task. 
Increased realism implies the loss of the powerful tool of calculus and game theory and there 
may be no well-defined solution to the resource allocation problem. Rosen (1997) is skeptical. 
The entrepreneur, even though probably of critical importance for growth, ”lacks operational 
definition” and is too ”elusive” a concept to ever fit into the neoclassical model. While Rosen 
(1997) is no friend of ad hoc entrepreneurship theory without an explicit market context, he 
believes that “neoclassical economics undoubtedly would be enriched by a more fully 
articulated view of competition as a selection device … and generator of economic change,” 
the elusive entrepreneur being understood as the driver of competition. Even though Baumol 
is not quoted in Rosen´s article, the two appear to agree on this count and to be implicitly 
skeptical of much of neo-Schumpeterian theorizing lacking a well-defined economic context. 
 
Quite understandably then, few attempts have been made since Baumol’s 1968 paper to make 
neoclassical theory more entrepreneurial, and those efforts have amounted to little more than 
using an entrepreneurial terminology, and, therefore, have not yet taken us much further. Here 
we agree with Baumol (2000) that simulation offers new opportunities to study complex   7
disequilibrium economics and that even though simulation of disequilibrium models does not 
provide fully general and representative results, ”for example” is a powerful method to 
empirically disprove results based on analytical models. Even though the exogenous 
equilibrium conventionally defined will probably have to be abandoned if we introduce a 
relevant entrepreneur in the neoclassical model, such considerations suggest that we should 
be able to redefine the concept of equilibrium to make it compatible with the dynamics of a 
model of an entrepreneurial economy (Eliasson, 1991). 
 
Institutions and Incentives Direct Economic Change 
Baumol’s 1990 article in the Journal of Political Economy specifically deals with the effect of 
institutions/the social payoff structure on the distribution of entrepreneurship between 
productive and unproductive/destructive activities. He assumes that the supply of 
entrepreneurship, i.e., the application of entrepreneurial talent, is roughly a constant, while its 
distribution between productive and unproductive or even destructive activities is greatly 
affected by the social payoff structure. He tests this proposition in an exploratory fashion on 
highly varying historical contexts such as Ancient Rome, China under the Sung Dynasty and 
the UK in the Late Middle Ages, and asks what were the institutions that allowed the UK to 
embark on a sustainable growth process lasting for centuries, while the technologically 
advanced China economy remained stagnant. Baumol’s broad historical analysis strongly 
suggests that the factors that ”forge the structure of payoffs” for entrepreneurship are many-
faceted, but that they are nevertheless a central part of the explanation.  
 
The idea in the 1990 article is taken several steps further in Baumol´s 1993 book 
Entrepreneurship, Management and the Structure of Payoffs. In addition to the broad 
historical analysis a number of new applications of the basic idea are presented. Among other 
things he discusses the role of entrepreneurship in corporate takeovers and litigation and how 
the rules of the game should be designed so that wasteful rent-seeking behavior is avoided. 
Some first-generation analytical models are also suggested. The model presented in the 
epilogue is designed to capture the fact that variables such as education and investment, 
customarily assumed to be exogenous in conventional growth analysis, are really endogenous 
variables. Investment and education largely take place as a response to growth, while the 
ultimate cause of growth (North, 1990) is the level of productive entrepreneurial activity.   8
 
Baumol´s most recent book The Free-Market Innovation Machine – Analyzing the Growth 
Miracle of Capitalism, published in 2002, examines the capacity of the free-market economy 
”to produce a stream of applied innovations” and a rapid rate of growth. This book challenges 
yet another type of received wisdom in mainstream economics, namely that price competition 
is a prime driver of economic growth. Instead he stresses the combined and highly powerful 
effect of entrepreneurial innovation and routine/systematic innovation in incumbent firms, in 
particular the large firms in oligopolized industries. Thus, for the leading firms in capitalist 
economies not price but product innovation becomes the major means by which firms stay 
competitive. This characteristic of industrial dynamics, Baumol argues, has turned the free-
market economy into such a successful growth machine. 
 
Baumol’s prize lecture, given at the Stockholm School of Economics on May 22, 2003, was 
entitled ”The Role of Large and Small Firms in Innovation: The David and Goliath 
Symbiosis”. In that lecture he synthesized the insights from the 1993 and 2002 books. The 
lecture was a beautiful demonstration of Baumol’s far-reaching erudition and extraordinary 
ability to improve our understanding of the big issues. Still, the main message can be easily 
summarized. Capitalism is unrivalled when it comes to innovation and economic growth. This 
achievement presupposes both the individual entrepreneur and the large oligopolistic firm. 
With few exceptions major innovations emanate from the ingenuity and serendipity of 
individual entrepreneurs (Scherer, 1980), but in order to transform the original innovation into 
a full-scale innovation that sizably enhances productivity and welfare large firms become 
crucial. Their routinized step-by-step improvements of the original concept is necessary to 
reap the full benefits of the capitalistic organization of the economy. In fact, for the large 
firms in high-tech industries innovation is a matter of long-run survival. There is a continuous 
”arms race” involving all the large firms and in order not to lose ground to its competitors 




The accumulation of factors of production per se – be they knowledge, physical or human 
capital – cannot alone explain economic development. They are necessary inputs in   9
production, but they are not in themselves sufficient for economic growth to occur. 
Economists, however, thought so for a long time and in centrally planned economies and 
many third world countries massive investments in human and physical capital did not 
produce much prosperity. Human creativity and productive entrepreneurship are needed to 
combine these inputs in profitable ways, and hence an institutional environment that 
encourages free entrepreneurship becomes the ultimate determinant of economic growth.
3 
Thus, the entrepreneur and entrepreneurship should take center stage in any effort to explain 
long-term economic development.  
 
William Baumol has now urged the profession for at least 35 years to give the entrepreneur a 
central role also in mainstream theorizing. Whether the complexity of the entrepreneurial 
function can eventually be modeled so that it becomes a key actor in the mainstream model, 
and not just in the real world, remains to be seen. But whatever the outcome, the urge of one 
of the most highly respected mainstream economists of his generation will never lose its 
relevance. A body of economic theory that fails to deal with what is likely to be the most 
important factor for growth and renewal – individuals pursuing entrepreneurial opportunities 
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